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DIEGO ESPARZA AND THOMAS C. BRUNEAU
Closing the Gap Between Law
Enforcement and National Security
Intelligence: Comparative Approaches
Gunfire from a modified semi-automatic weapon wielded by a lone gunman
took the lives of 59 people in Las Vegas Nevada in October 2017.1 In
November 2015, 129 people were killed in the Paris terrorist attacks.2 In
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August 2017, 13 people died in an Islamic State (ISIS) attack in Barcelona.3
Although in different countries, perpetrated by various means, and for
different purposes, these attacks have one thing in common: the responders
are the police. In confronting twenty-first-century terrorism, the police are on
the front lines of national security issues. But they are not alone. To preempt
attacks each country’s intelligence community (IC) strives to gather
information on security threats. Although both the police and intelligence
agencies are tasked with protecting the state, property, and citizens, they
often fail to collaborate on these goals. And yet, bridging the gap between
the two is necessary for assuring safety. Scholars and practitioners of
intelligence have long sought ways to bridge that gap. How and when can
police forces be used to enhance national security intelligence? What factors
increase the likelihood of success (or failure) in utilizing the police as
intelligence collectors? Four critical factors determine the successful
integration of the police into the intelligence cycle:
1. the structure of law enforcement regimes;
2. how police are trained;
3. the strategic outlook police apply to intelligence gathering; and
4. the degree of embeddedness of police agencies in the overall
intelligence framework.
THE POLICING ISSUE
Jean-Paul Brodeur, a leading scholar on the topic of police intelligence, has
laid out useful concepts of “high” and “low” policing. High policing seeks to
gather data for national security purposes, while low policing is geared
towards building evidence in criminal cases.”4 Brodeur also deals with the use
of actionable intelligence. High policing engages in both overt or covert
surveillance with a greater “tendency to absorb intelligence, translating it into
action only when there are no more justifiable alternatives.”5 In low policing,
intelligence is a means to an end, wherein gathered evidence “will spur an
agency to undertake public proceedings such as charging a suspect or making
an arrest.” Thus, “the object of high policing is the protection of the state
apparatus” while low policing seeks to protect property and citizens.6
Brodeur notes that after the Islamist attacks on the United States of 11
September 2001 (9/11) and the rise of terrorism across the globe, several
countries began to blend the high and low police functions. Subsequent
research has focused on the problems and promise of elevating local policing
into the national security framework.7
Several scholars in the United States have worked on the topics of
intelligence-led policing,8 integrating state, local, and even tribal law
enforcement in conducting police intelligence,9 and the threat of supplanting
community-oriented policing with homeland security priorities.10 Research
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has also been conducted on the relatively new concept of fusion centers,
which many hope will turn American police into intelligence operatives.11
Some scholars have compared U.S. fusion centers with similar developments
in other countries.12 In so doing, much of the research work tends to be
critical of the reform process in the United States.13 While Brodeur's
discussion of blending high and low policing has provided valuable insights,
no comprehensive theory has yet emerged on how to successfully utilize
police as intelligence collectors.14 But the academic research to date has not
provided a definitive assessment of the factors that might contribute to the
successful use of police to enhance any or all parts of the intelligence cycle.
Here, we argue that the structure of the police sector, whether centralized or
decentralized, largely determines its ability to contribute to intelligence. The
task of generating sufficient, actionable intelligence is exacerbated by multiple
police agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. In centralized police systems,
this problem is significantly reduced and the process streamlined by limiting
the number of national police agencies working on intelligence.15
The centralization of police services allows for greater specialization, with
entire brigades or units assigned to intelligence duties, whereas in
decentralized systems, budget limitations usually prevent cities from creating
such specialization. Centralized systems also allow for the implementation of
strategies and policies rooted in national guidance, whereas decentralized
systems depend on locally bound entities which emphasize criminal activity
alone. Hence, we suggest the following hypotheses:
(H-1) If the law enforcement organizations of a country are
decentralized, then the police will be less likely to contribute to the
intelligence cycle.
But structure, in and of itself, does not necessarily restrict the use of local
police for national security intelligence. In fact, a national police system
might fail to enhance the intelligence cycle for one simple reason: it does not
train its police to do that kind of work. Therefore, appropriate training is
critical in developing police capability to do intelligence work. In intelligence-
light training regimes, police would logically be less useful in conducting
intelligence assignments, whereas intelligence-heavy training regimes would
produce police who are better able to gather, process, analyze, interpret, and
act on intelligence.
(H-2) If the law enforcement organizations of a country do not offer
training in intelligence gathering for specialized units or generally, then
the police will be less likely to have an impact on intelligence.
Yet, even with the proper structure and relevant training, the police might
still not enhance intelligence collection when they continue to define
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information as data to prosecute criminals alone and forget about the goal of
national security. As such, the prevailing strategic structures in a police
system matter considerably. Conceptually, the spectrum of intelligence
strategies ranges from the non-existent to comprehensive. At the lowest level
are the police forces having no strategy for contributing to intelligence,
meaning that they make no concerted effort on information-gathering,
though they might occur on an ad hoc basis. Next comes criminal
intelligence, which involves gathering information for the purpose of
prosecuting criminal offenders. Criminal intelligence, which prevails in
modern police forces, is defined by the archetype of the American big-city
detective who gathers material on different cases for the purpose of their
prosecution. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is the gathering of data and
statistical analysis to predict criminal activities and possible locations, and
thereby help deploy patrols to dissuade crime in those regions. Jerry H.
Ratcliffe has defined ILP as “a business model and managerial philosophy
where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective,
decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction,
disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective
enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.”16 This
strategy is typified by New York City’s use of metrics using CompStat
models. A fourth type, domestic security intelligence, involves the gathering
of information for the purposes of protecting society from chemical,
biological, and radiological (CBR) threats, as well as other political violence
and terrorism. This Domestic Intelligence approach is utilized in the United
States by the Department of Homeland Security and its components, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, and U.S. Marshals. National security intelligence seeks to address
threats originating from outside the country. In the United States, the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
employ this method. Finally, the comprehensive intelligence approach in
gathering intelligence helps in prosecuting criminals, deploying crime
reduction patrols, domestic security, and national security. Police systems
may choose to use one, many, or even all these approaches. Thus,
(H-3) If the law enforcement organizations of a country do not employ a
comprehensive intelligence strategy, then the police will be less likely to
have an impact on the intelligence cycle.
The degree to which the police can function to enhance the intelligence
sector largely depends on how well and in what ways they are embedded in
the overarching intelligence framework. Law enforcement services are either
lodged in the IC or not. When police are not embedded, they have limited or
no contact with the upper echelons of governments, and lack formal or
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informal information-sharing relationships with other IC members.
Conversely, lodged police systems tend to have a well-structured network of
formal and informal institutional mechanisms of information sharing and
direct access to national security stakeholders in the government. Hence:
(H-4) If the law enforcement organizations of a country have no formal
or informal status within the overarching national security intelligence
family, then the police will be less likely to have an impact on the
intelligence cycle.
Thus, the degree to which police can enhance the intelligence cycle depends
on their structure, training, strategy, and embeddedness in the intelligence
community. This police–intelligence community relationship, detailing these
dimensions, can be explored regarding the United States, France, and Spain.
In short, the four conditions, when combined, are sufficient for an effective
relationship. The gap between law enforcement and intelligence gathering
can't be closed unless all four conditions are present. If they are, nothing else
is needed.
Variables, Data, and Methods
Ultimately, since every intelligence institution seeks to be as effective and
efficient as possible in obtaining intelligence, application of the intelligence
cycle is required. The degree to which agencies or states apply each of its
steps defines their ability to collect information. Failure in one or more area
will undermine intelligence capacity, while complete adherence leads to its
enhancement. This concept allows a clear and objective standard by which to
judge the degree to which police engage in these areas, and hence assess the
overall difference in their intelligence gathering capabilities. The values of the
independent variables used in compiling this data can be found in Table 1.
In assessing the differences in each country's integration of police, the
concept of the intelligence cycle functions as the dependent variable. Much
has been written about the intelligence cycle as the key element. For instance,
the RAND Corporation’s Gregory Treverton has offered a five-step model of
the intelligence cycle with feedback loops, while Evans Geraint has illustrated
a hub and spoke model of intelligence.17 Here we rely on former intelligence
official Mark Lowenthal's formulation highlighting a linear process with
Table 1. Expanatory Variables and Measures
Independent Variable Law Enforcing Conditions
Structure of Police Decentralized or Centralized?
Strategy None, Criminal, ILP, NSI, or CIS?
Training in Intel Limited or Substantial?
Embeddedness Dislodged or Lodged?
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continual feedback loops.18 Despite the fact that many have cautioned that
the intelligence model as an inaccurate description of the actuality of
intelligence gathering, Lowenthal's concept is clear, concise, useful and, most
importantly, amenable to comparison across cases.19
In Lowenthal’s formulation, the intelligence cycle consists of seven steps:
1. agencies prioritize which problems they will be addressing and the required
information they need;
2. intelligence is collected.
3. the gathered data must be processed before it is given to analysts. This may
require the data to be converted from a foreign language or decrypted.
4. the material needs to be analyzed and developed into reports;
5. the parsed information is transferred to stakeholders;
6. the use of intelligence by relevant actors to take actions if necessary. and
7. there is a feedback phase where consumers inform the producers of how the
knowledge will be used or how the intelligence gathering process can be
further targeted and improved upon.
Table 2 illustrates the basic configuration in identifying the component of
the intelligence cycle and offering a coding rule as to whether or not police
play a significant role in enhancing that element.
In assessing about each variable and outcome, we have relied primarily on
data provided by experts on the police and intelligence services in each
nation. Available secondary sources and government documents flesh out
any areas left unclear, as does information received from experts on the topic.
Comparative Method, Scope, and Limitations
The United States, France, and Spain allow for a valid comparison, given
their similar security and socio-political contexts, and their similar attempts
to integrate police into intelligence work. But they differ on the critical
variables. Regarding security, each country has become a central target of
extremist terrorists with connections to Middle East groups. This targeting is
related to the past colonial and neocolonial activities of the three countries.
France has connections with Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, and Tunisia in
Table 2. Dependent Variable Measure
Component of Intel Cycle Do Police Enhance Component?
Requirements Yes or No
Collection Yes or No
Processing and Exploitation Yes of No
Analysis and Production Yes or No
Dissemination Yes or No
Consumption Yes or No
Feedback Yes or No
Overall Level of Enhancement of Total
Components Enhanced
Low (1–3), Medium, (4–5), or High (6–7)
Enhancement
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North Africa. Spain has and had colonial interests in Ceuta, Melilla, Spanish
Morocco, and Spanish Sahara, and was an ally of the United States in the
twenty-first century invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. The
United States has had a series of neocolonial relationships with the region,
using both its covert mechanisms and overt military apparatus. This
involvement has placed the U.S. at the center of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, the Lebanese civil wars, the Syrian civil war, Egyptian-Israeli
relations, Iraqi–Iranian–Afghan politics, and in East and North Africa.
The three countries are advanced industrialized democracies, which aids in
controlling potentially confounding variables found in more impoverished non-
democratic regimes. As Peter Chalk noted, since the late “1960s when terrorism
emerged as a significant feature of domestic and international political life, liberal
democracies have been struggling with the problem of how to respond in a
manner that is consistent with their norms of legitimacy and acceptability.”20 As
such, the scope of our study has been limited essentially to industrialized
democratic regimes because the limits on state responses to those threats placed
by considerations of civil liberties are unique to liberal democracies. Conversely,
non-democratic regimes need not balance civil rights with security, readily
sacrificing freedoms to crush dissent. Non-democratic regimes further complicate
research into policing because they tend to have secret police, whose primary job
is to gather intelligence for the purpose of repressing political dissent. Hence, they
do not confront the restrictive issues faced by liberal democracies.
All three countries are also threatened by extremist religious and political
groups that advocate for secession or political revolution on the far Left and
Right, as well as Islamic terrorism. Linked with these similar threats has been
a similar response: attempts to reform intelligence and to incorporate police
services in the intelligence gathering process. In the United States, some 1000
anti-government groups and more than 900 hate groups of various sizes and
goals have the potential for terrorist activities.21 The U.S. has experienced
incidents originating in Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Washington’s first
real attempt at integrating policing and national security came after the 1993
attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. In response, in 1996
the major cities of New York and Los Angeles stood up the Terrorism Early
Warning (TEW) system, which eventually became the L.A. JRIC. The TEW
system was financed mainly by state and local entities, with the most
extensive component in-kind contributions coming from participating
agencies.22 Within the context of the TEW, the Los Angeles Police
Department and the New York Police Department (NYPD) established
dedicated units to provide first responders and political leaders with an
assessment of potential threats. However, the inability of the New York
TEW to stop the 9/11 attacks dealt a blow to the attractiveness of this model,
but not a fatal one since the hijacking of commercial passenger airliners in
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Boston and flying them into the World Trade Center buildings could not
have been prevented by the NYPD under any circumstances unless it had
had an informer in the city’s Islamic community who could have forewarned
the FBI, Federal Aviation Agency officials, and the U.S. Air Force of the
plot. Since then various police departments in metropolitan areas have
established dedicated intelligence divisions. The aftermath of the attacks and
the investigations that followed led to increased calls for more police
involvement in the intelligence framework. For instance, the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission) identified the gaps in information sharing among foreign and
domestic intelligence agencies as central to the security failure of 9/11.23
Several of its recommendations were enacted into federal law,24 including the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which directed
law enforcement to become involved in counter-terrorism activity.25 To
address the issue of resources, federal legislation created incentives, including
funding and personnel benefits, to promote government-wide information
sharing, and included a vision of utilizing local police as additional resources
in information gathering and sharing.26
France has long been a prime target for religious and political terrorism.
The highest profile attack in the aftermath of World War II came in 1961
when the Organisation Arm!ee Secr"ete (OAS),27 a right-wing group, derailed
a train, killing 28 and injuring hundreds. Revolutionary terrorists, such as
Carlos the Jackal, operated later, in the 1980s,28 as did the Lebanese Armed
Revolutionary Faction and ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia), as well as Action Directe and, on the Right, the
French and European Nationalist Party.29 The most pressing threat,
however, is from the Islamic State–linked terrorist groups that perpetrated
the Paris attacks of November 2015. In response, France has sought to
develop closer ties between high- and low-policing, and increasingly relies on
police services for intelligence gathering.30 In France, the Direction de la
Surveillance du Territoire (Directorate of Territorial Security, or DST) serves
as France’s main internal intelligence agency regarding mitigating domestic
threats from external sources.31 The DST maintains an extremely close
working relationship with French law enforcement.32 Although France has
not developed a fusion center like the Center for Counter-Terrorism and
Counter-Crime Intelligence (CITCO) in Spain or the various fusion centers in
the U. S., it has elevated the National Police and National Gendarmerie to
higher policing functions.33
Of the three nations Spain has the most extensive history of intelligence
in policing. Its roots are in the old Francisco Franco regime’s efforts to
counter anti-Franco movements, especially the Basque separatist group
known as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Spain has also been the target of
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the left-wing First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group, and, on the
right, by such organizations as the Batallon Vasco Espa~nol.34 Out of the
repressive Franco-era tradition was born a robust homeland security system
incorporating the Civil Guard and Spanish National Police Intelligence
Service. Spain has also sought to elevate low policing into high policing to
face the extant threat of Islamic extremist. Specifically, after the Madrid train
bombings of 11 March 2004, the Spanish government created the National
Center for Intelligence which focused on both domestic and foreign threats.
Seeing the need to further integrate law enforcement intelligence into a
comprehensive security strategy, Spain developed CITCO in 2014 by Royal
Decree 873/2014, unifying the Centro Nacional de Coordinaci!on
Antiterrorista (CNCA) and the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen
Organizado (CICO).35
Despite facing similar issues, the three countries differ in the institutional
configuration of their intelligence communities, their police organization, and
their pattern of law enforcement integration into the overall intelligence
structure. As such, our project approximates an effort at most-similar
systems design.36 Although this approach has been used to test established
theories, we use the method of comparison to create an internally valid
argument in order to advance new ways of thinking about intelligence and
policing, though it may, of course, be subjected to further refinements in
subsequent stand-alone projects.37
POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES
Stanford University’s Amy Zegart argues in her 2007 book, Spying Blind,
that the American government has made several efforts to increase
information sharing and national security intelligence gathering. But all have
failed.38 According to Zegart, until 9/11 the U.S. Intelligence Community’s
(IC) fragmentation made it unable to counter the terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington, D.C. for three reasons. First, massive competition
existed between the CIA and the foreign intelligence services maintained by
the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research—INR)
and the DIA. Before 9/11, the IC was composed of sixteen agencies or
departments that, in gathering international intelligence, competed more than
cooperated.39 Second, successful reform remained elusive due to the division
of power between Congress and the Presidency, which further complicated
the potential for improvement.40 Reform was also complicated by the
bifurcation of domestic intelligence organizations like the FBI and the
international or national security intelligence organizations—the CIA, INR,
and DIA.
The “solution” to intelligence fragmentation after 9/11 was to create yet
another agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
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and to consolidate twenty-two independent organizations into the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).41 In addition to new
organizations, such as the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) at the
ODNI, and an emphasis on intelligence in the FBI and creation of the
Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) branch of the DHS, the federal government
also sought to promote fusion centers. Fusion centers are a “collaborative
effort of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that
combine resources, expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing
the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and
respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”42 Fusion centers were considered
a panacea that would overcome the challenge of linking the nation’s 15,000
separate local police departments and 27,000 fire departments to the IC. The
fusion center concept was conceived as a solution to the lack of information
sharing between federal and non-federal partners.43 An initial goal of the
National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC) was to utilize local police to
gather information through tips, leads, and Suspicious Activity Reports
(SARs), which would then be incorporated into the Information Sharing
Environment, which the fusion center would then receive, analyze, and
disseminate. The NNFC is made up of individual fusion centers spread
across the U.S., connected by various mechanisms for sharing information
vertically and horizontally.44 Although fusion centers remain a local or state-
level initiative, the DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have
supported their development, with the goal of elevating low policing into
high policing. Yet, local law enforcement officers in the United States still
engage primarily in low policing despite federal and state attempts to upgrade
their efforts to national security intelligence procurement.
The Decentralized Organization of American Policing
According to the 2013 Bureau of Justice Statistics report on Local Police
Departments, the United States has 12,326 municipal police agencies with a
total 477,317 sworn officers and 127,642 civilian staff. Also, the country
features 3,012 county sheriff agencies, with 188,952 sworn officers and 62,952
civilians. Finally, the fifty state police agencies have 58,421 sworn officers and
employ 30,076 civilians.45 Thus, more than 99 percent of the county’s law
enforcement institutions, as well as 88 percent of their civilian personnel, are
employed by municipal or county departments. And the majority of local
agencies are small. For instance, according to the 2013 LEMAS Surveys, 48
percent of local police departments employed fewer than ten full-time sworn
officers. In 2013, 74.9 percent of all the police forces had fewer than 24
officers.46 From all indications, the future of American policing will continue
to feature small police departments. A decentralized police system
automatically faces the collective action problem of coordinating divergent
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agencies with divergent interests and capacities. Smaller police departments
also tend to have fewer available resources that might allow them to dedicate
their personnel to intelligence work, let alone train every officer for
such tasks.
Lack of Intelligence Training in American Police System
Without relevant training police forces can have no practical role in
intelligence work. In the U.S., police officers, whether members of large
forces or small town units, are minimally trained in intelligence gathering.
Despite a recognition that intelligence training needs to be enhanced, in
practice, most officers train for six months in police academies, with two
months of field training, little of which is related to intelligence.47 Although
95 percent of the academies provide basic training on terrorism-related
topics, only 53 percent of those surveyed were preparing personnel for
intelligence gathering.48 On average, officers receive 1,364hours of training,
of which only nine are dedicated to counterterrorism and intelligence.49
Arguably, patrol officers do not engage in intelligence as much as their
higher-ranked detective counterparts. Yet, detectives do not go back to the
police academy to study how to become detectives, but instead learn on the
job. Hence, what they initially learn at the police academy prior to actually
joining the force is usually their only career exposure to intelligence. While
large metropolitan police forces may feature entire operational intelligence
divisions dedicated to combating threats, they represent only a small fraction
of the overall policing landscape. Furthermore, even in those units the
training regimen tends to again be limited to intelligence-led policing, rather
than national security intelligence gathering.
Additionally, police departments have limited education requirements. As
of 2013, 84 percent of departments had a minimum requirement of a high
school diploma, while only 10 percent required a two-year associate’s degree
and a mere one percent required a four-year bachelor’s degree. This matters
because police are not required to have a higher degree of specialization in
areas such as statistics, computer science, or social science that could
facilitate intelligence gathering and analysis.
Law Enforcement’s Strategic Orientation in the United States
The police in the United States have a different strategic outlook than
traditional intelligence gathering services. Street level police work entails
patrolling, waiting for calls, and addressing summonses. As Robert Simeral
has noted, police officers “collect and share information; but they don't view
it as ‘intelligence’ as much as … creating their situational awareness.”50 The
predominant police mindset is to support investigations and catch criminals.
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Police have little incentive to engage in intelligence gathering at the street
level. Promotions tend to be based on assessments of their performance by
their local commanders and chiefs. Hence, their priority is local—municipal
or county—security. For instance, Richard R. Johnson has stated that
“officers who produced the most drug arrests were more likely to have
perceived that drug arrests were rewarded by their agency, perceived that
management saw drug enforcement as a priority, received specialized training
in drug interdiction, and perceived that they had sufficient time in their shift
to properly investigate suspected drug offenses.”51 In this sense, Johnson
noted that incentives and training coalesce into a predictable behavior: police
will do the things they are trained to do if they are prioritized and bring them
benefits.52 Terrorism is a low likelihood event. Police perceive a more
consistent threat from criminal elements than from terrorists. Thus, their
priority is not combating transnational terrorist cells per se, but the dangers
posed by local criminal elements.
Police spend only 29 percent of their working day on committed tasks, such
as answering calls. The remaining 71 percent of their time is spent dealing with
administrative tasks (36 percent), patrolling on foot or in cars (28 percent),
and the other 7 percent on self-initiated activities.53 Thus, nearly three quarters
of an officer’s uncommitted time is discretionary. Officers often spend their
time in the police station, waiting for a crime, accident, or other incident to
occur and being dispatched in response. When patrolling, a somewhat more
dynamic aspect of policing, officers seek to establish their presence in crime-
ridden areas or investigate suspicious criminal activities. They generally do not
spend time receiving and analyzing intelligence briefings, conducting
investigations into terrorist cells, or otherwise gathering information not
related to their main tasks. Thus, when not addressing local public security
issues, police officers are waiting to address local public safety threats or
catching up on paperwork. They tend to work on shifts of 8–10hours, 4–5
times per week, with the time of day often varying. Their primary mission is
not prevention, but stopping crimes that are in progress or investigating those
that have already taken place. They are, after all, tasked to assist in providing
the necessary evidence that a legal violation has occurred for an action to be
prosecuted.54 Although some sporadic support exists for the National
Suspicious Activity Reports Initiative, and larger city police departments
frequently support collection of national security intelligence, smaller
departments rarely know what SAR is, what it means, or how to enhance it.55
United States Police Departments and Relations with the National
Intelligence Community
Since all police agencies are created and operate under state constitutions,
they are technically state agencies. The federal government has no legal
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foundation for dictating the organization, training, or use of local police. The
10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution empowers states to enact
legislation and create institutions that do not fall under the constitutional
purview of the federal government. This means that federal reform initiatives
in the police field need not be adopted at the local level. Fusion centers were
created to fill the gap in domestic intelligence collection, analysis, and
reporting that is not, or cannot be, managed by the federal level due to states’
rights. But the new units do so only partially. The 79 fusion centers, based
primarily on state geographic districts, seldom collaborate, in contrast to the
coordination that was anticipated and intended.
The key bridges between the IC and local police should be the fusion centers
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
Both are intended to feed important data to the IC. The FBI focuses on
counterterrorism, felonies, and high crimes. The fusion centers concentrate on
feeding counterterrorism information to the JTTF and establishing local
situational awareness at the regional, state, and municipal levels. Fusion centers
allow DHS and NCTC representatives at the local level to coordinate national
intelligence requirements and tasking.56 Although fusion centers are not
fully-controlled federal assets, they do receive technical assistance and funding
from federal agencies. The DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is
the federal agency providing higher-level support to fusion centers. Although
the I&A’s ability to determine fusion center outcomes is limited, its support
includes personnel, access to shared information databases, and connections
to other federal agencies. The I&A also conducts an annual assessment
that tracks performance and capability development across the center network.
This activity falls under its Fusion Center Performance Program, which is
tasked with the annual evaluation, conduct exercises to test capabilities, and
mitigate any gaps to sustain or improve fusion center operations.
Undoubtedly, the fusion centers and federal grants have had an impact on
reorienting local law enforcement towards thinking more carefully about
homeland defense.57 Despite those advances, the challenges of identifying
relevant threats, let alone coordinating that effort to in some manner
“connect the dots,” is difficult. The network consists of 79 federally
recognized fusion centers, including 50 at the state level, and another 29 in
major urban areas and U.S. territories. Host or parent agencies in those
jurisdictions include the state police, metropolitan police departments, and
state-level homeland security and emergency management services. Internally,
the fusion center consists of a director, an operations manager or analyst
supervisor, intelligence analysts, and liaisons from federal, state, local, and
private sector partners. Staffing ranges from as few as four analysts to over
200, depending on the resources of the parent agency and needs in the area
of operation.
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The focus of the fusion centers varies tremendously, according to where they
have been established, and how they subsequently evolve to meet state and local
needs. A common phrase when discussing fusion centers with those involved or
who study them is: When you have seen one fusion center you have seen one
fusion center. That is, generalizations are not possible, given the variety of the
79 fusion centers.58 One expert, who has ongoing close involvements with
virtually all fusion centers in the U.S., indicates that between one third and one
half work well.59 Fusion center effectiveness has been systematically analyzed by
Andrew Coffey.60 Since they rely on the police for leads and tips, questions
remain as to how active the fusion centers are and how effective they can be.61
But grants in aid to create fusion centers can become more available when states
and federal agents are willing to cooperate. Federal funding to fusion center
budgets is at the discretion of the state and local governments which determine
the degree and amount of federal grants to be allocated to fusion centers each
year among other agencies competing for Homeland Security needs. Those
governments are not obligated to use the federal funds for fusion centers.
Moreover, as federal funds have decreased, states and local entities have tended
to make up the difference out of other resources.62
While the Department of Defense (DoD) controls all but eight (CIA, Drug
Enforcement Administration, DHS, INR, Energy, FBI, Treasury, and
ODNI) of the seventeen agencies making up the IC, and more than 80
percent of the IC’s total budget, the intelligence fusion centers actually have
nothing to do with the DoD. Yet, according to Amy Zegart, one major part
of the IC with which the fusion centers are involved, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, despite efforts and statements to the contrary, has not
overcome its “low policing” orientation.63
The departments of Homeland Security and Justice (DOJ), and within the
DOJ, mainly the FBI, deploy or assign either part- or full-time personnel to
fusion centers to support their operations and serve as liaisons between the
centers and federal components. Yet, they remain mostly local or state level
organizations.64 The DHS and DOJ share classified and unclassified
homeland security and terrorism information with the fusion centers through
several technology networks and systems. The DHS has installed the
Homeland Secure Data Network, which supports the sharing of federal
secret-level intelligence and information with its state, local, and tribal
partners. It also provides an unclassified network, the Homeland Security
Information Network, which allows for a broader sharing of less sensitive
security and terrorism-related information. The DHS and DOJ partner in
offering fusion centers a variety of training and technical assistance
programs. These are extremely important for both encouraging the input of
citizens to the process and increasing the effectiveness of local police by
giving them access to national-level databases and networks.
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Fusion centers are intended to serve their clients, or stakeholders, by
providing specific resources or services that may include a dedicated product
line of intelligence or information products issued on a regular basis. Their
contents may consist of notifications to police, threat assessments for pre-
planned events, or reports that synthesize sensitive data. Analysts also
provide operational and tactical support, such as conducting background
checks, analyzing criminal data for trends and patterns, and issuing SARs. In
addition, fusion center personnel are routinely asked to respond to requests
for information from a range of entities. Table 3 illustrates an independent
variable that we use to code each value. The decentralized American law
enforcement system has limited intelligence training, maintains an approach
that seeks to collect intelligence for combating crime, and is not incorporated
into the national IC.
Does U.S. Law Enforcement Impact Intelligence?
Table 4 shows that law enforcement does not have a substantial impact on
U.S. Intelligence. Although police officials should help develop intelligence
requirements, most do not. Police departments usually expect the fusion
centers to feed them intelligence. The rub is that the police do not adequately
define the intelligence support requirements on which the fusion centers can
act. Although the police do collect intelligence to catch criminals, they are
less effective in managing intelligence for the SAR national collection
platform and ensuring that potentially significant collection makes its way to
the IC. The local police do implement intelligence, but again their actions
usually do not cross into national intelligence channels as they tend to be
deemed “law enforcement sensitive.” Regarding the analysis and production
of intelligence by police departments, the delivery of their products is limited
within their ranks or shared with other police units and perhaps a fusion
Table 4. Assessment of the American Police Intelligence Integration
Component of Intel Cycle Does Law Enforcement Play Role?
Requirements No
Collection No
Processing and Exploitation No




Overall Impact of Police on Intelligence Low
Table 3. American Law Enforcement System
Structure of Police Decentralized
Training in Intel Limited to None
Strategy Criminal Intelligence
Embeddedness Not Incorporated
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center. But that information is not considered intelligence production by the
IC. It may be part of a continuous sharing of tactical information to address
the immediate situation, but not likely to form part of a long-term security
strategy. Police departments do disseminate intelligence to other police
agencies, but not to members of the IC at the state or national levels.
Although DHS I&A liaison representatives are seconded to fusion centers,
and move select pieces of intelligence to the IC, the process is uneven and
ill-defined, and many I&A reps feel under-utilized. If the fusion center or
JTTF believes the information is significant, it will push the data higher.
Police services consume intelligence typically from DHS I & A through the
fusion centers, or through the FBI. Again, police services do not provide
adequate feedback to improve the next round of intelligence gathering.
Fusion liaison officers (FLOs) have trained within police departments to
enable local collaboration. These FLOs take what they pick up at the local
level, digest it, and provide feedback up the line, usually to a fusion center.
Generally speaking, police in the United States continue to have a low impact
in the national IC intelligence cycle. This is evinced by several recent events—
among them, the terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, the truck ramming of
bicyclists in New York City, the shooting of dozens of people from a hotel
window in Las Vegas. Little intelligence was available to thwart or mitigate
those attacks. A lot of intelligence surfaced later on, however, providing
examples of the failure of the “see something say something” process
exemplified by police intelligence models.
The structural and institutional dynamics of the hyper-decentralized U.S.
police system minimize the likelihood of its changing to meet the security
needs of domestic intelligence. Intelligence gathering is neither emphasized in
the training academies nor incentivized by local agencies. It is antithetical to
the first responder mission of the police. For this reason, despite 9/11 the
police system has not changed to address the intelligence gap. The evidence is
clear. The 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
survey for the Department of Justice shows that 62.1 percent of agencies
surveyed had no sworn officers working on intelligence gathering. In the 2007
LEMAS survey, that number jumps to 75.4 percent. Meanwhile, in 2007,
only 56 percent of police agencies used computers for intelligence gathering.
Policing and intelligence in the United States remain fixed in low policing,
with limited movement towards high policing. Table 4 shows that the
weakness in police integration is due to the system’s structural, training,
strategic, and institutional embeddedness.
THE CENTRALIZED POLICING STRUCTURE OF FRENCH LAW ENFORCEMENT
The centrally structured French police system has three primary services: the
National Police (PN), the local police for the Prefecture of Paris (DRPP),
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and the National Gendarmerie (GN). Theoretically, both the NP and DRPP
are national police agencies, but the DRPP behaves in effect as an
autonomous police force, given the immense jurisdiction and importance of
Paris. The civilian-oriented NP and DRPP, organized and controlled by the
Ministry of the Interior, provide police service to the country’s major urban
centers with approximately 144,000 police and 98,000 gendarmes.65 The GN,
a militarily oriented police force, provides police services to the nation’s rural
areas. With around 101,000 personnel, it operates under the aegis of the
Ministry of National Defense.
French Police Services Training in Intelligence
Although the average PN agent does not train in intelligence processes for
national security purposes, the service has a long tradition of specialized
intelligence divisions that operate as necessary. In 2010, an “Acad!emie du
renseignement” was established for high-ranking personnel from the several
intelligence services, including the DGSI, the PN’s intelligence branch.66
Historically, the GN has not had specialized intelligence units since the
service believed that the duty of every gendarme is to be trained in
intelligence and investigation skills. Yet, even though every gendarme collects
intelligence, the type of information obtained has not traditionally been of
national security concern. Only recently has the GN begun to focus on
national security intelligence.
French Police Strategic Orientation
Again, until recently none of the French police services has historically had a
comprehensive strategic outlook regarding intelligence. Nevertheless, the PN
tends to take the lead on domestic intelligence for national security in three
specific ways. First, the PN has traditionally played a vital role in French
intelligence, dealing with most national security concerns. The principal
intelligence body for domestic issues is the Direction g!en!erale de la s!ecurit!e
int!erieure (DGSI).67 Composed 90 percent of police officers, it deals with high-
value targets regarding terrorism, counterintelligence, and CBRN (chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear) threats. Despite its intelligence role, the
DGSI also has a specific directorate with criminal investigation powers.
Second, the National Police houses the Central Territorial Intelligence
Service (SCRT), whose work includes the detection and investigation of
violent and extremist movements. Under the control of the Central Direction
of Public Security with the Ministry of Interior, its officers work to prevent
strikes and anticipate demonstrations or riots; as such, they focus on rapidly
changing socio-political situations.68 It is charged with gathering intelligence
concerning all areas of institutional, economic, and social conditions which
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may lead to protests and violent activities against the state. The service is
composed of a majority of national police, as well as elements from the
gendarmes. Of its seven divisions, the most important for intelligence
purposes is the Division of Research and Support which engages in
antiterrorism surveillance. Although the SCRT deals with lower-level threats
than does the DGSI, it seeks to identify potentially higher risks and refer
them to the DGSI, which then takes over for further intelligence gathering.
Third, the Parisian police elements have their version of the DGSI, the
DRPP. A mix between SCRT and DGSI, it deals with every type of
intelligence.
Traditionally, the GN has not had an intelligence service. Due to the
largely rural nature of their police work, the Gendarmerie brigades deal
mainly with petty crime and community policing in non-urban areas, with an
emphasis on crime control. Hence, their contribution regarding counter-
terrorism has been rather limited. Moreover, the Gendarmerie had no culture
of intelligence and did not use the intelligence cycle. That being the case, the
collected information was rarely analyzed; it was either transmitted as raw
data or lost in the loop. The Gendarmerie played only a nominal role in the
French intelligence framework, and had no personnel in the DGSI.
Over time, and given increasing terrorism, the Gendarmerie evidently needed a
specialized intelligence unit to collate and analyze information. Therefore, it
gradually began to reorient itself towards national security intelligence.
Consequently, the Gendarmerie has since 2014 significantly improved its
intelligence capacity at the national level and created the Sub-Directorate of
Operational Anticipation (SDAO) with the same mission as the DGSI but within
its own jurisdiction. Thus, the NP and DRPP gather information on domestic
counter-terrorism, domestic counterespionage, internal counterintelligence,
general intelligence, and on political radicalization. The GN contributes to
various intelligence bodies by seconding staffs to intelligence units, working in
financial intelligence, internal counterterrorism, counterradicalization in the
countryside, and on organized crime units in other agencies.69
Police Relations with the French IC
The French IC is made up of eight main agencies distributed throughout the
Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Finance. The Ministry of Defense has the
General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), the Military Intelligence
Directorate (DRM), and the Directorate on Defense Protection and Security
(DRSD). The Ministry of the Interior has the three agencies grounded in
police institutions: the DGSI, the SCRT, and the DRPP. The Ministry of
Finance has the TRACFIN (Intelligence and Action Against Clandestine
Financial Channels) and the DNRED (National Direction of Intelligence and
Investigations of Trade Duties).70
CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 339
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 32, NUMBER 2
The relationship between the police intelligence wings and the IC has been
historically strained. To start, the DGSI is not appreciated by the other
intelligence agencies, and is criticized for its lack of cooperation, reliance
upon old-fashioned intelligence methods, and its redundancy with the work
of other organizations. Indeed, many 21st-century terrorist attacks revealed
that the DGSI had not detected the threat and failed to appropriately handle
the situation, despite all the information that had been collected or shared
with it. But this relationship has nonetheless improved since 2009 for two
reasons. First, the National Intelligence Council (CNR) created a Council for
National Defense and Security to advise the President of France. Its role is to
coordinate the intelligence production and activity within the IC itself,
meaning those from the Department of National Defense, the Ministry of
Economy, and the Ministry of Interior, including the DGSI. The CNR
regularly organizes meetings with the six service heads, and often with the
President. It has liaison officers in every intelligence service. This institutional
coordination mechanism has improved communication among the IC’s units.
Strongly influential in bringing the IC together were the terrorist attacks of
2015.71 Taking these configurations together, as illustrated in Table 5, the
French Law enforcement system is now more centralized, features a
comprehensive strategy, offers some unit-specific training in intelligence, and
seems to be well incorporated in the IC.
Do French Police Play a Role in Intelligence?
French police institutions play a much more central role in intelligence
gathering than do their counterparts in the United States (see Table 6). In
France, both the Gendarmes and French National Police officers put
substantial effort into developing intelligence requirements, collection,
exploitation, analysis, and the production of intelligence. Despite ongoing
turf wars, both police services disseminate data to other agencies, and
Table 5. The French Law Enforcement System
Structure of Police Centralized
Strategy Comprehensive
Training in Intel Some Unit-Specific but Ad Hoc
Embeddedness Incorporated
Table 6. Assessment of French Police Intelligence Integration
Component of Intel Cycle Does Law Enforcement Play Role?
Requirements Yes
Collection Yes
Processing and Exploitation Yes




Overall Impact of Police on Intelligence Very High
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consume information from other agencies, especially if it relates to terrorism.
Finally, studies show that the police do help refine intelligence requirements.
Consequently, the French police systems have a very high impact on the
issues of counterterrorism and counterintelligence.72
THE CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF POLICING IN SPAIN
The Spanish law enforcement system is heavily centralized, featuring
approximately 69,000 local police officers, 25,000 autonomous region police
offices, and 141,000 Civil Guards and National Police.73 The National Police,
a civilian-led institution whose jurisdiction spans all of the Spanish territories,
operates primarily in urban settings but has overall responsibility for issues
relating to migration. The Civil Guard, a militarized police force which works
in rural areas and the countryside, has overall responsibility for issues
relating to weapons control. Municipal police—the city police—mostly, but
not only, operate in the country’s autonomous regions, including Catalonia,
Basque Provinces, and Navarre. The Catalonian and Basque police substitute
for all police functions of national police and civil guard, whereas the
Navarre police augment the Civil Guard and National Police. While other
regions have mixed approaches, depending on the constitutional roles
assigned to the two national and the one local police, in all cases, the crime
investigation units of the National Police and Civil Guard are present.
Spanish Police Intelligence Training
Both national police services have remarkably well-trained intelligence
personnel. All national police officers are tutored in intelligence gathering
when they join intelligence units for a month during the final part of their
basic training. Since its creation in 1844, the Civil Guard has been involved in
intelligence gathering as a fundamental attribute of the force, as stipulated in
Article 26 of the Cartilla del Guardia Civil, the institutional code that specifies
the identity and functions of the force.74
Each national level police force has its intelligence service. The Civil Guard
(GC) has the Servicio de Informaci!on de la Guardia Civil (SIGC) and the
Polic!ıa Nacional (PN) has the Comisar!ıa General de Informaci!on. Both
belong to the national level Fusion Center (Centro de Inteligencia contra el
Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado—CITCO).75 Their personnel, selected
from all ranks of police, must pass an exam and take training courses in
intelligence prior to joining the security branch of their respective institutions.
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Spanish Police Strategic Approach to Intelligence
The PN and the GC police intelligence services comprehensively approach
intelligence.76 Both the Civil Guard and National Police maintain no barriers
between their anti-crime and anti-national security efforts,77 believing that
such criminal activities as drug trafficking fund national security threats,
including terrorism. The services gather all sorts of intelligence: human,
signals, and imagery.
Embeddedness of Spanish Police Services in IC
The Spanish IC is divided into three main areas. Under the Ministry of the
Interior, the Secretary of State of Security includes both the CNP (Cuerpo
Nacional de Policia) and the GC. The office of the Deputy Prime Minister
(Vice-President) hosts the Government Commission for Intelligence Issues
that has oversight over the National Intelligence Center (CNI). And the
Ministry of Defense hosts the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Defense (JEMAD)
that house the CIFAS, the central intelligence agency of the armed forces.
Catalan’s Mossos d’Escuadra has the General Commission of intelligence
(CGI), while the Ertzaintza in the Basque provinces has the Office of Central
Information (OCI).
The Civil Guard and National Police statutorily play a central role in
national security intelligence in accordance with the Ley Org!anica de Fuerzas
de Seguridad of February 1986, and through the Comisar!ıa General de
Informaci!on (Police) and Servicio de Informaci!on de la Guardia Civil (GC).78
Spanish law enforcement's role in intelligence is exerted via CITCO.79
Created in 2014 by the Royal Decree 873/2014 unifying the CNCA with the
CICO, CITCO receives, integrates, and analyzes information on terrorism,
radicalization, and organized crime. The primary goal in creating CITCO
was to establish standard criteria and coordination among the different
institutions engaged in countering organized crime and terrorism, thereby
avoiding duplication.80 It designs specific strategies against these threats, and
establishes criteria for coordination and action when operational units within
the National Police Corps and the Civil Guard are working on the same
investigations. But CITCO has neither an intelligence collection remit nor an
operational mandate.81
As a sub-directorate inside the Ministry of the Interior, and made up of
police officers, CITCO is well embedded in the intelligence community. It has
agreements and protocols with the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (Centro
de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Espa~nolas—CIFAS); regional police
forces such as the Basque Ertzaintza and the Catalan Mossos d’Esquadra
also provide intelligence feeds. Basque, Catalu~na, and Navarre provinces
have intelligence units in their police forces that also provide information in
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CITCO. Recent expert assessments indicate that coordination and
cooperation among the CNI and the police services have been very useful.82
When either police service gathers intelligence that has direct relevance to the
CNI, they share it, and conversely when CNI obtains information that may
not be relevant to national security but rather regarding criminal activities
that lay in the jurisdiction of police, it readily shares the data with the police
services.83 Table 7 discusses the structure of Spanish police and intelligence.
Do Spanish Police Improve National Security Intelligence?
The police forces strongly enhance the intelligence cycle for comprehensive
security purposes. They help develop intelligence requirements through the
Directiva Nacional de Inteligencia, a secret unit that lists the intelligence
needs. They also collect intelligence alongside the DOs at the other services.
Within each intelligence branch, police personnel are assigned to process and
exploit knowledge, and perform analysis and production. The police services,
working within the CITCO framework, disseminate and consume
information, and ultimately provide feedback to refine requirements. For
these reasons, Spain’s police services enhance the intelligence cycle, especially
when taking into consideration their counterterrorism tradition.84 Table 8
assesses Spanish police integration into the intelligence cycle.
COLLABORATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION: TESTING
OUR HYPOTHESES
The differences among these cases are summarized in Table 9. The successful
integration of police in France and Spain enhances the intelligence cycle.
Both are centralized, have a comprehensive police strategy, with extensive
training for officers involved in intelligence activity, and are squarely
embedded in the overall national IC. As a result, the Spanish and French
Table 8. Assessment of the Spanish Police Intelligence Integration
Requirements Yes
Collection Yes
Processing and Exploitation Yes




Overall Impact of Police on Intelligence High
Table 7. Spanish Law Enforcement System
Structure of Police Centralized
Strategy Comprehensive
Training in Intel General and Unit Specific
Embeddedness Incorporated
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police forces contribute to national security by strengthening the intelligence
cycle. Since the Islamist attacks on the United States of 9/11 the U.S.
Intelligence Community has tried to use local police as a force multiplier in
increasing its intelligence effectiveness. But Washington has not had the same
success as its two European counterparts. In the U.S., the police are
decentralized, intelligence training is limited, intelligence strategy is oriented
towards criminal prosecution, and those fusion centers that might act to
embed police services in the IC do not do so. Hence, the police contribute
minimally to the intelligence cycle concerning national security, as indicated
in Table 9.
Four dimensions contribute to the integration of law enforcement into
intelligence processes: (1) structural; (2) training; (3) strategic; and (4)
embeddedness. From the start, a fragmented law enforcement system already
makes policing difficult. Structure matters, but is itself not sufficient to lead
to the high or low integration of police in the intelligence cycle. As such, we
note that our hypothesis H-1—If the law enforcement organizations of a
country are decentralized, the police will be less likely to have an impact on
the intelligence cycle—is valid and plausible as an explanation within the
countries studied and potentially to other nations as well.
The second factor is whether police personnel receive appropriate training
in the skills of developing, gathering, interpreting, and analyzing intelligence
and revising intelligence-gathering processes. If the police are not trained to
gather information, they will not do it. However, even if they are trained to
gather evidence, the type chosen tends to depend on the strategic outlook for
law enforcement. Because of this, we consider that H-2—If the law
enforcement organizations of a country do not offer training in intelligence
gathering for specialized units or generally, then the police will be less likely
to have an impact on the intelligence cycle—is weaker. Although the United
States has weak training in police intelligence, so does France, which does
not train all its police in intelligence gathering. Moreover, in France, police
intelligence training is done on the job, and hence has only limited formality.
Conversely, in Spain, PN and GC agents have undergone both formal
Table 9. Country Assessment
Country The United States France Spain
Terrorist Threat Level High High High
Developed Nation Yes Yes Yes
Western Culture Yes Yes Yes
Imperial History Yes Yes Yes
Involvement in the Middle East Yes Yes Yes
Domestic Political Threats Yes Yes Yes
Structure of Police Decentralized Centralized Centralized
Police Intel Strategy Criminal Prosecution Comprehensive Comprehensive
Training in Intelligence Minimal Ad-Hoc Unit General
Embeddedness No Yes Yes
Impact of Police on Intel Cycle Low High High
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training and some on the job experience as they rotate through units. These
mixed results lead us to conclude that academic police training may not be
required, although some training regimen would be necessary.
The third problem was strategic scope. For instance, while the French
national police seem to have developed functional intelligence divisions, the
gendarmerie has been a bit slower and may not need to do so at all.
Although the DGSI and SCRT provide a useful framework, the issue rests
on strategy. Law enforcement views policing through the prism of minimizing
crime, not national security. So, its strategy is controlling crime rather than a
fusion of crime control and terrorism control. The ILP strategy here is
dangerous because it focuses on crime intelligence cycles that lead to the
arrest of traditional criminals, not national security cycles that deal with
CBRE threats. While, in Spain and France, all police services have gravitated
towards more comprehensive strategies due to the nature of the perils they
face, those in the U.S. have not. Thus, H-3—If the law enforcement
organizations of a country do not employ a comprehensive intelligence
strategy, then the police will be less likely to have an impact on the
intelligence cycle—becomes plausible.
The experience of decades against ETA and the current threat of Islamic
terrorism stimulates the Spanish police forces to maintain the reliable
theoretical and practical knowledge that has won the respect of other
intelligence agencies internationally. But that emphasis seems to rub
traditional intelligence officers at the national level the wrong way, at least in
France, and leads to a fourth problem: the lack of embeddedness. This
element is critical in developing norms of reciprocity that are built on
dividing duties while continuing to gather and share intelligence broadly.
Here the Spanish model seems to be doing best. Although the Civil Guard
and National Police could merely assemble data relevant to crime control,
they instead also obtain other forms of information and are willing to share
it, even though doing so is not necessarily within their mission roles. Spain’s
national security intelligence apparatus also collects intelligence on both
criminal and national security threats and shares the criminal intelligence
downward when it finds it. Furthermore, since the Spanish intelligence
community cannot make domestic arrests, it relies on the police for
cooperation on the arrest of individuals it deems essential. Thus, both need
and help each other. This collaboration seems to embed the national police
and Civil Guard into the intelligence framework, while also providing a
strategic outlook of both ILP and national security intelligence gathering.
The resulting structure thereby facilitates intelligence gathering. Both the
French and Spanish police systems have stronger formal and informal
institutional linkages to the national intelligence networks than those in the
United States. In the U.S., the fusion centers seem like good conduits, but
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they remain local initiatives, are fragmented, and have weak links to national
intelligence agencies. All 104 JTTFs are under the purview of the FBI. Thus,
H-4—If the law enforcement organizations of a country have no formal or
informal status within the overarching national security intelligence family,
then the police will be less likely to have an impact on the intelligence cycle.
THE POTENTIAL OF CENTRALIZATION
The most recent publication of the U.S. Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), Domestic Approach to National Intelligence, lists the
components of the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT)
government organizations “… to engage with one another to carry out the
shared mission of protecting the homeland.”85 Beginning with the fusion
centers, the report lists and describes the roles and responsibilities of seven
supporting organizations, along with the seventeen members of the IC. With
the creation of Fusion Centers, the goal was to leverage the first
responders—police, firemen, and police forces on tribal reservations (many of
which overlap state and even international boundaries)—into an
“intelligence-sharing system.” But local law enforcement cannot be efficiently
integrated to support this goal in the United States under the current
institutional matrix. What changes could make police more effective in
collecting intelligence? By analyzing the relationships in France and Spain
and applying them to the United States and other countries trying to
incorporate police into intelligence structure we found that centralization
may facilitate the process. But, in the U.S. federal government centralization
is probably not feasible. Yet, some degree of centralization can take place, if
not at the federal level, then at the state level. Such action is not necessarily
aimed at controlling the police, but rather to reinforce their expected roles,
duties, and training through the development of Police/Peace Officer
Standards and Training (POST). Second, police can be given specialized
training funded by the federal government, with lateral entry into larger
police departments. Additional training in fundamental intelligence gathering
work and practices can be built into local police department routines. Third
is the strategic outlook. Changing the strategic vision of overall policing is
much more difficult, but specialized units can be created at the state level to
ensure better intelligence. While costly, training all police personnel in
intelligence gathering is not necessary. Having intelligence units assigned to
police stations by state governments may work. Such services as highway
patrol officers, state troopers, and state police should have an intelligence
presence in large sheriff’s departments and municipal police, with additional
duties in canvassing police forces in suburban areas. Part of their work would
be to train local police to fill out SARs for follow up by state agencies. FLO
officers could be regional liaisons for state apparatuses. Ultimately, the
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embedding of federal personnel would likely require state bodies to report to
the intelligence committees in Congress. But it could also mean that their
data collection is delivered upward and shared with a statewide network, and
with federal staff who could utilize the information. These recommendations
turn on the main problem: the structural organization of a country’s policing
establishment. Decentralized countries—with the U.S. as probably the most
decentralized in the world—need to address issues of federalism, states’
rights, funded and unfunded mandates, grant structures, and legal
frameworks. While these are large and polemical issues, with sufficient
motivation coupled with knowledge from other countries’ experiences, they
should be manageable.
Obviously, motivation and incentives are key. The fact that the U.S. has
not been successfully attacked on a scale of 9/11 for nearly two decades does
not mean that another assault would not be successful. Considering their
geographical location and very large Middle Eastern and North African
populations, the fact that terrorism is perceived in France and Spain as a
major threat is easy to understand.86 Their leaders have responded to the
incipient threat. Although the U.S. has devoted a tremendous amount of
energy and resources, ostensibly in response to the threat of terrorism, our
comparative analysis finds the response less than impressive.
Theoretically, that the police would be natural agents to gather intelligence
makes sense. On a daily basis, police scour the streets for criminals and have
a keen interest in maintaining local surveillance over groups engaged in
criminal and violent activities. Yet, the police are already overtaxed and
usually undertrained. Decoupled from the federal political framework, they
depend instead on local and state governments. In this analysis, utilizing a
comparative perspective from the experience of France and Spain, we
presented four dimensions of why incorporating police into a national
security framework in the U.S. is so complex.
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